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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following is offered in clarification and in 
addition to Appellant's STATEMENT OF THE CASE in Appellant's 
Brief. 
In approximately 1984, Appellant was retained by Ellis 
and Karen Lehmberg to assist in the closing of a real estate 
transaction involving a home legally titled to Ellis 
Lehmberg and Karen Lehmberg's parents. Tr., Vol. I, p. 41. 
Karen Lehmberg was sole owner of the home prior to 
quit-claiming her interests to Mr. Lehmberg and her parents. 
Ms. Lehmberg quit-claimed her interest at the suggestion of 
Mr. Lehmberg so as to avoid certain liens as a result of 
obligations owed by Karen Lehmberg. Tr., Vol. I, p. 41. 
Appellant arranged and completed the sale of the 
Lehmberg's home resulting in net proceeds of $5,599.95. 
Appellant, at the time of the closing received $2,000.00 for 
the legal services he rendered in connection with the sale. 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 142. The proceeds of $5,599.95 was 
deposited in Appellant's trust account. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 
54-55. 
At the time of the sale and subsequently, Ellis and 
Karen Lehmberg became embroiled in a divorce action wherein 
the proceeds of the sale of the home became a disputed 
marital asset. Ellis Lehmberg was represented in the 
divorce action by Thomas D. Roberts and Karen Lehmberg was 
represented by Jim Mitsunaga. In May, 1982, a hearing 
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on an Order to Show Cause was held during which Appellant 
was present in the courtroom and acknowledged to Judge Uno 
that he was holding the proceeds of the sale in his trust 
account and acknowledged the Judge's direction to continue 
holding funds pending the Court's final disposition of the 
funds. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 13-14; 17. Appellant did not at 
that time or prior thereto express any claim or indicate 
that he had an attorney's lien on said proceeds. Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 100. 
A second temporary restraining order was entered on or 
about June 2, 1982, wherein Jim Mitsunaga and Thorn Roberts 
were to be signatories on an account with the trust monies 
deposited therein. However, Mr. Roberts suggested in a 
letter to Mr. Mitsunaga dated July 1, 1982, that it would be 
better to leave the funds in Mr. Knowltonfs trust account. 
Exhibit P-l. The pertinent portion of that letter reads as 
follows: 
The other difference has to do with the transference of 
the trust funds which are currently held by Ben 
Knowlton. On further discovery, these funds are not 
held in a single and separate trust account, but 
rather are held with other trust monies of Mr. Knowlton 
in a Paine & Webber account, with the funds separated 
by and individually accounted for by modern 
technological equipment. It is my understanding that 
funds in this account are earning interest at 
approximately the rate of 19%, and therefore it seems 
silly to take them out of that account and put them in 
to an account which bears less interest. Further, as 
there are other monies in the account, you and I can 
not be put upon the signature card, nor exercise any 
control other than the Courts order with regard to 
authorization of the release of said monies. If you 
have any strong objection to this, please contact me and 
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we can make arrangements to transfer the monies. I of 
course, do not have any reservation with regard to the 
holding of these monies under Court order by Mr. 
Knowlton. 
Mr. Roberts did not suggest at that time that 
Respondent may have any interest in said funds and admitted 
in his own testimony at trial that the first time Appellant 
informed him he was asserting an attorney's lien is January 
27, 1988, the day after the divorce trial. Tr., Vol. I, 
pp. 133-134. Pursuant to Mr. Robert's representations to 
Jim Mitsunaga, Respondent continued to hold the proceeds in 
trust. Tr., Vol. I, p. 15. 
On or about January 25, 1983, a trial was held in the 
Lehmberg v. Lehmberg divorce, which resulted in Judge 
Billings rendering Findings and Conclusions from the Bench. 
Among other orders, Judge Billings awarded the monies held 
in trust by Respondent to Karen Lehmberg. On the same day 
and immediately after trial, Jim Mitsunaga walked to 
Appellant's law office and informed Appellant that the 
monies had been awarded to Karen Lehmberg. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 
21-22. Appellant indicated that he would pay out the monies 
when he received the signed decree and paperwork. Tr., Vol. 
I, pp. 21-22. 
On or about January 26, 1983, Appellant contacted 
attorney D. Aron Stanton for an opinion as to an attorney's 
liens. Tr., Vol. I, p. 69. Mr. Stanton provided Appellant 
with a copy of the attorney's liens statute and advised him 
that an attorney could assert a lien for fees. Tr., Vol. I, 
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p. 76. Mr. Stanton, however, was unaware of the nature of 
legal services rendered by Appellant nor the connection of 
the legal services to the proceeds being held by Appellant. 
Tr., Vol. I. pp. 75-76. 
Despite what Appellant believed was a legal opinion 
that he could assert an attorney's lien on the proceeds, 
Appellant did not advise Mr. Mitsunaga or Karen Lehmberg of 
such a lien until approximately September 21, 1983, when he 
tendered two (2) checks on which he stopped payment. 
Tr., Vol. I, pp. 17-18; 23; 32. 
From the end of January 1983, through the fall of 1983, 
Mr. Mitsunaga made numerous inquires of Appellant as to 
payment of the monies to which no response was made until 
September, 1983. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 21-23. Finally, Karen 
Lehmberg filed suit against Appellant in a case styled Karen 
Lehmberg v. Benjamin P. Knowlton, Case No. C83-7982, Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Tr., 
Vol. I, pp. 23-24. 
At the disciplinary trial, Appellant in attempting to 
show that he had a valid attorney's lien, could not produce 
any contemporaneous time slips or billing statements to show 
the amount of attorney's fees owing to him from Ellis 
Lehmberg. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 181-186. In fact, Appellant 
could only produce an estimation of fees owing prepared for 
the disciplinary trial. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 181-186. In 
addition, Appellant admitted that a portion of the sum he 
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claimed against the sale proceeds were personal loans from 
Appellant to Ellis Lehmberg. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 147; 152. 
Based on the above material facts, the 
Disciplinary Hearing Panel entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline for 
which Appellant now appeals. At the time the Panel 
deliberated and decided a recommended sanction, Appellant 
reserved the right to appeal from the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law but that, if the Findings and Conclusions 
were upheld he stipulated to the recommended discipline. 
Tr., Vol. II, pp. 16-17. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Board err as a matter of law in concluding 
that Appellantfs conduct was intentional and dishonest in 
violation of the Code of Professional Conduct? 
2. Was Appellant's action in holding trust monies 
received in his capacity as an attorney, a commercial 
transaction outside the purview of the discipline process? 
3. Is Appellant precluded from asserting that the 
recommended discipline is unduly harsh and inappropriate 
given Appellant's stipulation to said discipline? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Board's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record and are not arbitrary or capricious. 
Appellant has not shown that any specific findings are 
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contrary to the record. Appellant merely disagrees with the 
characterization of Appellant's conduct from the facts. The 
Board's characterization is reasonable based on the 
testimony and exhibits which comprise the record. 
Appellant's conduct did not arise from a commercial 
transaction. Rather, the record clearly supports the 
Board's findings and conclusions that Appellant received 
monies as a result of legal services rendered in connection 
with a sale of a home, that he knew and acknowledged that he 
was to hold them until a determination was made as to who 
was entitled to receive them, that Appellant did not assert 
any attorney's lien or claim as an attorney until after the 
money was awarded to Karen Lehmberg and that Appellant could 
not establish the amount of his attorney's fees. The 
cumulative conduct and Appellant's claim to the proceeds 
arise out of his status as an attorney. The circumstances 
were not a business transaction. 
Finally, Appellant having failed to establish any 
insufficiency with the Board's Findings and Conclusions, 
he is precluded from attacking the recommended sanction. 
Appellant stipulated to the sanction. Consequently, the 
Hearing Panel took no additional evidence other than to make 
a specific finding that Appellant's conduct was intentional 
and in bad faith. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE BOARD DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT'S 
CONDUCT WAS INTENTIONAL AND DISHONEST IN VIOLATION 
OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
A. THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE REASONABLE AND 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN 
THE RECORD. 
This Court has noted on numerous occasions, that though 
the Court has ultimate jurisdiction in disciplining 
attorneys, Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline received from the Board of Bar 
Commissioners, will generally be upheld unless a showing is 
made that such findings are arbitrary and capricious or not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See, e.g., 
In Re Robert B. Hansen, 584 P.2d 805, 807-808 (Utah 1978) 
citing In Re Macfarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631, 633 
(1960); In Re Johnston, 524 P.2d 593, 594 (Utah 1974). 
In Re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 493 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1972); 
In Re Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343, 344 (1965); 
Though Appellant in his Statement of the Case recites the 
facts differently than the Findings of Fact of record, 
Appellant challenges the factual findings only to the extent 
that he suggests to this Court that the facts were 
"mischaracterized." In particular, Appellant suggests that 
facts show that he had asserted and claimed a personal, 
valid interest in those proceeds that was timely and 
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properly asserted based on the legal advice received from D. 
Aron Stanton and that such negates any willful or dishonest 
intent on his part. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-13. 
B. APPELLANT'S CONDUCT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH 
CLAIMING AN ATTORNEY LIEN AND THE RECORD 
SUPPORTS THE PANEL'S FINDINGS THAT APPELLANT 
ACTED INTENTIONALLY AND DISHONESTLY. 
Appellant asserts that since he was claiming an 
attorney's lien to the proceeds, his taking of those monies 
cannot be deemed intentional or dishonest. Appellant's 
argument ignores the specific findings and conclusions of 
the Hearing Panel, findings and conclusions which are 
neither arbitrary nor capricious and which are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. The Findings 
specifically set forth the following critical facts: 1) 
that Appellant received attorney's fees in the sum of 
$2,000.00 for legal services rendered in the sale of the 
home; 2) Appellant could not establish the amount of the 
attorney's lien he claimed; 3) Appellant did not assert an 
attorney's lien until he learned the monies had been awarded 
to Ms. Lehmberg; 4) Appellant did not inform Ms. Lehmberg's 
attorney of his claim until approximately or shortly before 
September 21, 1983; 5) Appellant's claim to the money was 
based not only on outstanding legal fees but also 
outstanding personal loans. See Findings Nos. 3,5,6,9 and 
10; Tr., Vol. I. pp. 14; 21-22; 133-134; 142; 152 and Ex. 
P-l. In fact, Appellant told Mr. Mitsunaga that he would 
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pay the monies when he received the signed decree. Tr., 
Vol. I, pp. 21-22. 
From those facts, the Panel concluded: 
2. Utah Code Section 78-51-54 relating to 
attorney liens is only applicable to 
proceeds directly acquired from a cause 
of action in which an attorney represents 
the party; Respondent's claim of attorney's 
fee related to legal services other than 
the legal services performed for the sale 
of the home. 
See Findings and Conclusions, Conclusion of Law No. 2. 
The evidence at the disciplinary trial clearly and 
convincingly establish that Appellant did not assert nor 
claim nor put anyone on notice that he was asserting an 
attorney's lien until after he learned that the monies had 
been awarded to Karen Lehmberg. 
In addition, the Panel concluded that the attorney's 
lien statute is clear on its face that an attorney's lien 
attaches to proceeds acquired from the legal services 
rendered. Appellant was paid for the legal services 
rendered in connection with the sale of the home and the 
Panel concluded that Appellant's reliance on Mr. Stanton's 
advice was unreasonable given the circumstances. Finally, 
and perhaps, most importantly, the clear and convincing 
evidence at trial established that Appellant did not know at 
the time he asserted the lien nor at the time of the 
disciplinary trial, the amount of attorney's fees owing to 
him. Tr., Vol. I, p. 152. In fact, Appellant admitted at 
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trial that he felt he was entitled to the proceeds not only 
for outstanding fees but also for personal loans he made to 
Ellis Lehmberg. Tr., Vol, I, pp. 147; 152. 
The Disciplinary Hearing Panel and the Board's 
conclusions that Appellant's taking of the monies was 
knowing and willful and supported by clear and convincing 
evidence in the record and not arbitrary nor capricious. 
II 
APPELLANT WAS ACTING IN A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY 
ARISING FROM OF HIS STATUS AS AN ATTORNEY IN 
RECEIVING AND HOLDING THE SALE PROCEEDS AND 
WAS NOT ENGAGED IN A COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION. 
Appellant contends that his holding of the sale 
proceeds was in the nature of some sort of commercial or 
business transaction outside his responsibilities as an 
attorney and therefore outside the purview of disciplinary 
proceedings. In support thereof, Appellant cites In Re 
McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986). Consequently, Appellant 
argues that the Panel's findings and conclusions that he was 
acting in a fiduciary capacity as an attorney are erroneous. 
The evidence in the record clearly controverts 
Appellant's position and, in fact, the facts are quite 
analogous to In Re McCune where this Court found that such 
conduct is subject to the rules of professional conduct. In 
Re McCune, the attorney received money from his client to be 
held in trust for payment to certain third-parties, an 
out-of-state attorney and a court reporter. Instead of 
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paying those third-parties, the attorney kept those monies 
and applied them to his fees. This Court held that such was 
not a commercial transaction so as to take the attorney's 
conduct outside the purview of the disciplinary process. 
Similarly, in the instant case, Appellant obtained the 
sale proceeds as a result of his representation of a client; 
he acknowledged to the Court he was holding those monies and 
would continue to hold them until the Court determined their 
disposition. Tr., Vol. I, p. 14. Appellant continued to 
hold the monies in his trust account. Then, when it was 
determined that Karen Lehmberg, a third-party was to receive 
those monies, Appellant refused to pay them and applied the 
monies to his fees. In fact, Appellant asserted for the 
first time, an attorney's lien for legal services rendered 
which were legal services resulting in the sale unrelated to 
the proceeds and for personal loans. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 
21-23; 124-125, 133-134. At the point Appellant asserts his 
lien he claims he somehow established a commercial business 
relationship which exempts him from his ethical duties as 
an attorney. 
The facts simply and clearly are to the contrary and 
the Panel's findings reflect that by setting forth that "a 
trust relationship was established between Appellant in 
favor of Karen Lehmberg, who by virtue of the divorce decree 
succeeded to the interest of Ellis Lehmberg in said trust 
funds," that Appellant did not have a valid attorney's lien 
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claim and that Appellant converted said monies to his own 
personal use* See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline, pp. 3-4. 
Ill 
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING THAT THE 
RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE IS UNDULY HARSH AND 
INAPPROPRIATE. 
At the time of the disciplinary trial, pondent 
stipulated, based on the Panel's findings of intent and bad 
faith, to the six (6) month suspension, with five (5) months 
being stayed on the condition that one (1) month of actual 
suspension be served and that restitution of the money be 
made within the six-month period. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 16-17. 
Because of that stipulation, the Panel did not take 
additional evidence as to mitigating or aggravating factors 
which would normally be done at that stage of the 
disciplinary trial. 
Appellant's stipulation to the sanction was based on 
the Panel's findings with respect to intent being upheld an 
appeal. Consequently, Appellant in attacking the sanction 
must first establish the arbitrary or capricious nature of 
the Findings; yet, no showing has been made that those 
findings are not supported by the evidence or that the 
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations are arbitrary or 
capricious. The Panel summarized the basis of their 
findings of intent and bad faith as follows: 
...[W]e see a situation where money was given 
to Mr. Knowlton, and there was an acknowledge-
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ment by Mr. Knowlton he was holding those 
funds in trust..,. He indicated to the Court 
he would continue to hold the funds in 
trust.... There was no claim made against 
those funds, no admissible evidence presented 
to this Panel on which we could find any 
finding that there was any claim, by Mr. Ben 
Knowlton, to any portion of those funds 
until after he had been advised by Mr. 
Mitsunaga that those funds had been awarded 
to Karen Lehmberg.... There was totally 
insufficient evidence... that he was in fact 
entitled to any dollar amount of attorney's 
fees... and, for those reasons, ... we find 
that those funds were knowingly taken in 
violation of ethical standards. And we do 
find that they were taken in bad faith. 
Tr., Vol. II, pp. 15-16. 
Appellant additionally suggests, and cites several 
cases for the proposition, that his discipline is not 
consistent with other discipline imposed by this Court. The 
many cases Appellant cites actually support the recommended 
sanction. For example, the Court in In Re Robert B. Hansen, 
584 P.2d 805 (Utah 1978) did not impose a suspension because 
the Board made no finding imputing dishonesty or willful or 
intentional wrongdoing. That is not the case here. A 
finding of intent and bad faith was made and is supported by 
the evidence. In In Re Bybee, 629 P.2d 423 (Utah 1981), the 
Court imposed a two (2) month suspension for conduct that 
did not even involve the taking of money; the Court in Bybee 
indicated that the period of suspension was appropriate to 
emphasize the need for truthfulness and candor on the part 
of an attorney. In the instant case we certainly have an 
attorney who needs to understand candor, in addition, 
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Appellant's conduct here involves the entrusting to him of 
monies. 
Finally, Appellant suggests that the recommended 
discipline fails to take into account "extensive mitigating 
circumstances," The "extensive mitigating circumstances" 
are not enumerated nor does the record reflect any such 
circumstances. The record actually reflects Appellant's 
continued attempts to justify his taking of the money after 
the fact. 
CONCLUSION 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. Appellant respectfully requests 
that the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation be adopted 
in full and an Order of Discipline entered. 
/ 
Dated t h i s J t 1 * / day of X ^ W 1989 . 
Respectfully submitted, 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
Bar Counsel 
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